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1.  Introduction 
   Recent studies provide evidence that relatively higher levels of financial market 
development do indeed tend to lead to higher levels of economic performance. Jayaratne 
and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
(2004), all report significant evidence supporting the proposition that  higher levels of 
financial market development lead to higher levels of economic growth.  These papers 
are very careful to develop reasonable structural instruments to proxy for the relative 
amount of local financial market development. 
  In this paper, we investigate whether local financial market development helps to 
promote economic performance by focusing on a particular rationale for such a 
relationship.  That rationale is financial market development may increase the amount of 
external finance available to small firms.  Specifically, we examine whether a 
government intervention aimed at increasing small firms’ access to bank credit has a 
relatively greater impact in less financially developed markets in the U.S.  And, we use 
SBA loan guarantees as our government invention method.  We choose the small firm 
credit market because of the high degree of information asymmetry that may be 
associated with it.  And, because this information asymmetry may lead to a credit 
rationing problem as explained in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
  We focus on the SBA guaranteed lending program because our previous research 
(Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2007) suggests that SBA guaranteed lending has a small 
positive influence on the rate of economic growth in local geographic markets.  Also, our 
study is motivated by the important results reported in a recent paper by Riding and 
Haines (2001).  Drawing on empirical evidence to compare costs and benefits, Riding   2 
and Haines (2001) is one of the very few studies to demonstrate that the net contribution 
of a guaranteed lending program is positive.  They conclude that the Canadian loan 
guarantee program resulted in substantial total and incremental employment creation, and 
had a net positive effect on economic welfare.  Additionally, Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson (2008) found that loan guarantees tend to have a greater impact on employment 
creation in less financially developed markets.  The ideas that loan guarantee programs 
generally have net positive impacts on employment and that the magnitude of these 
impacts may differ across local geographic markets leads to the fundamental research 
question for this paper.  That question is this: Does local market financial development 
tend to mitigate the positive impact that loan guarantees tend to have on the level of local 
market employment?  In this paper, our null hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed lending 
does not impact less financially developed markets differently than more financially 
developed markets.  And, our primary alternative hypothesis is that SBA guaranteed 
lending has a greater impact on the employment rate in less financially developed 
markets.  This alternative hypothesis is based on three related assumptions.  These three 
assumptions are:   less developed financial markets are more likely to experience severe 
information asymmetry problems, and as Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out, that could 
lead to credit rationing, (2) SBA guaranteed lending is likely to reduce these credit 
rationing problems -- thus, improving the level of development of that local financial 
market, and (3) increased financial development helps to lubricate the wheels of 
economic performance and increase the effective level of labor utilization, or the 
employment rate (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).   3 
  We use a measure of liquidity based on local market bank deposits to measure 
financial market development.  Our results suggest that less financially developed 
markets are more positively impacted by SBA guaranteed lending.  Moreover, the 
positive impact of SBA guaranteed lending for high financially developed  markets is 
economically insignificant.  This result has important implications for public policy in 
general and SBA guaranteed lending in particular. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we provide 
some background on small business credit markets and economic performance.  In 
section 3 we provide a brief review of the academic literature on credit rationing.  This 
literature is consistent with the hypothesis that information problems in lending markets 
are particularly severe in the small firm credit market and hence provides a rationale for 
SBA loan guarantees.  An analysis of SBA lending programs is presented in section 4.  
The data, our hypotheses, and empirical strategy are outlined in section 5.  The results are 
presented in section 6.  Finally, our conclusions and some discussion of the implications 
of our research are provided in section 7. 
2.  Background on small business credit markets and economic growth 
A particular area of concern for policymakers is whether small businesses have 
access to adequate credit. Liquidity constraints prevent many would-be entrepreneurs 
from starting businesses because they must bear all of the risk (Evans & Jovanovich, 
1989). Policy makers care about this issue because net increases in small businesses are 
positively related to overall economic activity (Kirchoff & Phillips, 1988) and states with 
higher proportions of very small business employment experience higher levels of 
productivity growth with less wage inflation and lower unemployment rates (Robbins,   4 
Pantuosco, Parker, & Fuller, 2000). At the same time, however, most small firms are 
relatively young and have little or no credit history.  Lenders may also be reluctant to 
fund small firms with new and innovative products because of the difficulty associated 
with evaluating the risk of such products.  These difficulties are classic information 
problems—problems obtaining sufficient information about the parties involved in a 
transaction—and they may prevent otherwise creditworthy firms from obtaining credit.  
If information problems are substantial, they can lead to credit rationing, that is, loans are 
allocated by some mechanism other than price (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).  To the extent 
that credit rationing significantly affects small business credit markets, a rationale exists 
for supporting small enterprises through government programs aimed at improving small 
business access to credit.  
One specific government intervention aimed at improving the private market’s 
allocation of credit to small enterprises is the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
guaranteed lending program.  SBA loan guarantees are well established, and their volume 
has grown over the past decade.  Nearly 20 million small businesses have received direct 
or indirect help from one or another of the SBA’s programs since 1953.  The SBA's 
business loan portfolio of roughly 240,000 loans was worth about $60 billion in 2004, 
making it the largest single financial backer of small businesses in the United States.  To 
place this amount in perspective, consider that in June 2004 commercial banks reported a 
total of about $522 billion dollars of small business loans outstanding (SBA, 2005). 
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While not directly comparable because SBA guaranteed loan numbers include 
loans by nonbank lenders and include loans above the $1 million loan maximum reported 
by banks annually on the June call report, it is clear that the SBA is an important player   5 
in the small business lending market.  After all, SBA guaranteed loans could reasonably 
account for as much as 10% of total commercial bank small business loans outstanding.  
And, commercial banks provide the majority of small business credit supplied in the 
USA.   
To illustrate its importance to small businesses, Bitler, Robb, and Wolken (2001) 
report that commercial bank lending represents about one-third of total debt capital for 
these firms. Using the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances, they report that fifty-five 
percent of small firms (firms with 500 or fewer employees) in the Survey report some 
amount of outstanding loans, capital leases or lines of credit.  And, ninety-two percent of 
the largest small firms (those with 100-500 employees) reported having outstanding 
loans, capital leases, or lines of credit.  Additionally, of all firms reporting, about 89 
percent received at least one financial service (checking account, loan, cash management 
service, etc.) from a commercial bank. 
The rationale for SBA guarantees appears to be that credit market imperfections 
can result in small enterprises being credit rationed—particularly for longer-term loans 
for purposes such as capital expansion.  If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit 
rationing in the markets for small business loans, then there should be a relationship 
between measures of SBA guaranteed lending activities and economic performance.  
Craig, Jackson, and Thomson (2007), for example, found a positive (although small) and 
significant relationship between the level of SBA lending in a local market and future per 
capita income growth in that market.  Overall, their empirical results were consistent with 
a positive impact on the social welfare of SBA guaranteed lending.  Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson’s (2007) research focused primarily on the impact of credit markets on   6 
economic growth, however, and therefore they did not need to include several variables 
from the economic development literature in their analysis.  However, we believe the 
inclusion of several of these variables is appropriate for this paper.  In general, we 
include control variables that have been demonstrated to effect local market employment 
rates.   
We recognize that the private and public resources available to a community or 
local area will have a profound impact on its employment level.  This is also true for the 
depth and organizational structure of it capital, labor, and other markets.  Additionally, 
the operations of its institutions (e.g., local government) will impact educational 
attainment, public service levels, the overall quality of life, and the areas’ ability to attract 
and retain high quality employers.  We consider the impact of these characteristics in this 
study.  In particular, in this study we use a simplified version of the analysis in Craig, 
Jackson, and Thomson (2007) to evaluate a potential determinant of economic 
performance in less financially developed markets, or communities.  Specifically, we test 
whether SBA guaranteed lending to small firms has a relatively greater impact on the 
average level of labor employment in local markets that are less financially developed.  
We find that it does. 
  In the next section, we provide a brief discussion of the economics of small firm 
credit markets.  This discussion focuses on a highly select group of theoretical and 
empirical articles that help explain the severe credit allocation problems caused by 
imperfect information in small firm credit markets.  These articles also provide insight 
into the mechanism that allow a government intervention, such as the SBA guaranteed   7 
lending program, to result in higher economic performance in less financially developed 
markets. 
3.  The economics of small firm credit markets 
The economic justification for any government-sponsored small business lending 
program or loan guarantee program must rest on a generally acknowledged failure of 
private markets to allocate loans efficiently.  Absent such a clearly identified problem 
with private sector lending to small businesses, the SBA’s activities would simply seem a 
wasteful, politically motivated subsidy to this sector of the economy. 
 Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss (1981), suggest that private lending 
institutions may indeed fail to allocate loans efficiently because of fundamental 
information problems in the market for small business loans.   These information 
problems may be so severe that they lead to credit rationing and constitute failure of the 
private credit market.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that banks consider both the 
interest rate they receive on the loan and the riskiness of the loan when deciding to make 
a loan.  But the lack of perfect information in loan markets may cause two effects that 
allow the interest rate itself to affect the riskiness of the bank’s loan portfolio.  When the 
price affects the nature of the transaction, it is unlikely that a price will emerge that suits 
either the available buyers or sellers.  That is, no price will “clear the market”. The first 
effect, adverse selection, impedes the ability of markets to allocate credit using price 
(e.g., interest rates).  This may occur because an increase in interest rates may also 
increase the proportion of high risk borrowers in the set of likely borrowers.  The second 
effect, moral hazard, reduces the ability of interests rates to clear lending markets because 
it influences the ex post actions of borrowers.     8 
The adverse selection effect is a consequence of different borrowers having 
different probabilities of repaying their loans.  The expected return to the bank on a loan 
obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able to 
identify borrowers who are more likely to repay.  But it is difficult to identify such 
borrowers.  Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so.  The 
interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device.  For 
example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on average, 
worse risks.  These borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate because they 
perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower. In turn, this worsens the pool 
of firms that seek external financing from banks  (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).  So, as the 
interest rate rises, the average “riskiness” of those who are willing to borrow increases, 
and this may actually result in lowering the bank’s expected profits from lending.  
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior 
of the borrower is likely to also change.  For instance, raising the interest rate decreases 
the profitability of projects which succeed because of the associated higher interest 
payments.  Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to undertake riskier projects – 
projects with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when successful.  In other 
words, the interest rate a firm pays for credit may affect the investment decisions it makes 
after it gets the credit.  This is the moral hazard problem. 
As a result of these two effects, a bank’s expected return may increase less for an 
additional increase in the interest rate; and, beyond a certain point may actually decrease 
as the interest rate is increased.  Clearly, under these conditions, it is conceivable that the 
demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in equilibrium (Berger & Udell, 1998;   9 
Hyytinen, A., & Väänänen, L. 2006). Although traditional analysis would argue that in 
the presence of an excess demand for credit, unsatisfied borrowers would offer to pay a 
higher interest rate to the bank, bidding up the interest rate until demand equals supply, it 
does not happen in this case.  This is because the bank would not lend to someone who 
offered to pay the higher interest rate, as such a borrower is likely to be a worse risk than 
the average current borrower.  The expected return on a loan to this borrower at the 
higher interest rate may be actually lower than the expected return on the loans the bank 
is currently making.  Hence, there are no competitive forces leading supply to equal 
demand, and credit is rationed. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that when borrowers are distinguishable, the 
lender may decide to deny credit to an entire group.  This is their classic redlining 
argument.  We expect the likelihood of this type of credit rationing to be higher in less 
financially developed communities.  Furthermore, because the value of collecting 
information on borrowers may be lower in less financially developed markets, the levels 
of imperfect information may be higher in less financially developed markets. 
4.  Small Business Administration loan guarantee programs 
SBA loan guarantees may improve credit allocation by providing a mechanism 
for pricing loans that is independent of borrower behavior.  By reducing the expected loss 
associated with a loan default, the guarantee increases the expected return to the lender – 
without increasing the lending rate.  In the absence of adverse selection, lenders could 
simply offer loan rates to borrowers that reflected the average risk of the pool of 
borrowers.
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With the guarantee in place, the lender could profitably extend credit at loan rates 
below what would be dictated by the risk of the average borrower.  The reason for this is 
that the guarantee increases the profitability of the loan by reducing the losses to the bank 
in those instances when the borrower defaults.  To the extent that the loan guarantees 
reduce the rate of interest at which banks are willing to lend, external loan guarantees will 
help mitigate the moral hazard problem.  This is because the lower lending rates afforded 
by external guarantees reduce the bankruptcy threshold and thereby increase the expected 
return of safe projects vis-à-vis riskier ones. Additionally, lowering the lending rate 
increases the number of low risk borrowers applying for credit which, in turn, increases 
the likelihood that the average risk of firms applying for loans is representative of the 
pool of borrowers. Hence, external loan guarantees also help mitigate the adverse 
selection problem.  Thus, in theory, SBA loan guarantees should reduce the probability 
that a viable small business is credit rationed.   
A number of authors [for instance, Kane and Malkiel (1965), Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) and Petersen (1999)] have suggested that lending relationships are a market-based 
solution to credit rationing.  However, because relationships may be more costly for 
small businesses to establish relative to large businesses, and because lack of 
relationships may lead to severe credit rationing in the small business credit market, some 
form of government intervention to assist small businesses in establishing relationships 
with lenders may be appropriate.  However, the nature of intervention must be carefully 
evaluated.  SBA’s guaranteed lending programs may well be a reasonable intervention as 
they serve as a substitute for small business collateral. The program also reduces the risk 
to the lender of establishing a relationship with informationally opaque small business   11 
borrowers.  Finally, the SBA loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation 
process by lowering the risk to the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more 
closely meet the needs of small businesses for capital investment. (See Appendix B for a 
discussion of the details about the SBA guaranteed lending process.)   
5.  The hypotheses, data, and empirical strategy  
  One method likely to reduce the costs of credit rationing is to reduce the amount 
of asymmetric information in these credit markets.  One very practical method for doing 
this is to encourage lenders to make creditworthy loans that they would not otherwise 
make.  And, in so doing the lender develops a “relationship” with the borrower.  This 
relationship allows for the low-cost collection of borrower-specific information through 
basic monitoring of the loan.  This reduces future levels of asymmetric information and 
reduces credit rationing by fostering a continuing relationship between the small business 
and the lending entity located in the less financially developed market.   
We choose to study the impact of SBA guaranteed lending programs because this 
is where the empirical evidence is likely to be strongest concerning the impact of 
government intervention in small business credit markets.  This conclusion is based on 
three observations.  First, the SBA guaranteed lending programs are relatively large and 
have operated for a long time—more than a half a century.  Second, SBA loan guarantees 
are more likely to resolve the agency problems that give rise to credit rationing in these 
markets than most other approaches, like that of the Federal Home Loan Banks.  And, 
third, SBA guaranteed lending programs encompass all types of small business lenders, 
from community banks and thrifts to bigger banks.     12 
We take as our motivating proposition that credit market frictions—primarily in 
the form of costly information and verification of a small firm’s projects—can lead to a 
socially suboptimal credit allocation that negatively impacts the labor employment rate in 
the local market. Our implicit assumption here is that labor and capital are 
complements...at least for small firms.  To the extent that SBA guaranteed lending 
programs mitigate credit market frictions, there should be a positive relationship between 
SBA guaranteed lending and the level of employment, especially in less financially 
developed markets. Therefore, we test for whether SBA loan guarantees lessen credit 
market frictions by testing whether a measure of the normalized amount of SBA 
guaranteed lending in a local market is correlated with relatively higher levels of 
employment in less financially developed markets.  Our specific null hypothesis is: 
Ho:  There are no significant differences in the impact of SBA guaranteed lending 
on employment rates in less financially developed markets relative to more financially 
developed markets. 
Data 
To examine our hypothesis, we utilize data from three sources.  Our first source is 
loan-specific data—including borrower and lender information—on all SBA-guaranteed 
7(a) and 504 loans from 2 January 1991 through 31 December 2001.  A breakdown of 
loan size, total credit and number of loans under each guarantee program is displayed in 
tables A1 through A3 of the appendix.  Note that we have over 360,000 loans in our 
sample. Our loan information is based on the local market of the borrower, not the lender.    
Our second set of data is taken from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis   13 
(BEA) from 1991 through 2001.  These data sets provide our information on cross-
sectional economic conditions.  Our third source of data is the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s annual summary of deposit data (SUMD) files. This data provides our 
proxy for the level of financial market development.  
All of our individual loan data are aggregated to the local market level.  For this 
study, we also aggregate over time to produce cross-sectional observations for our local 
markets.  As in studies by Rhoades (1982), Berger and Hannon (1989), Calem and 
Carlino (1991), Jackson (1992a, 1992b), Shaffer (1994, 2004), and Berger (1995), we use 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to define the relevant local market for urban areas 
and non-MSA counties as the local market for rural areas.   
Empirical Strategy 
To test our null hypothesis we simplify the analysis of Craig, Jackson, and 
Thomson (2007).  These authors estimate their models using classic Arellano and Bond 
panel regression estimation techniques.  In this study, we estimate a simple cross-
sectional Generalized Least Squares (GLS) fixed-effects regression model that 
incorporates measures of employment levels over our sample period.  Our basic model is:  
EMPR i = α 0 + α 1 SBAPOP i + α 2 DEPPOP i  + α 3 HIGH i + α 4 SBAHIGH i   
+ β [Conditioning Set] i + ε i                         (1) 
Equation (1) uses EMPR to proxy for local market economic performance.  EMPR is the 
average annual employment percentage rate over our sample period [1991 to 2001] in the 
local market.  Each annual employment rate is calculated as one minus the annual   14 
unemployment rate.  The annual unemployment rates are taken from the website for the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
We are interested in how SBA guaranteed lending affects the cross-sectional 
levels of EMPR.  The primary variables of interest on the right side of Equation (1) are 
SBAPOP, HIGH, and SBAHIGH.  SBAPOP is the average annual per capita dollar 
amount of SBA guaranteed loan originations in the local market.  Before averaging, each 
of these annual per capita dollar amounts of SBA guaranteed loans was inflation adjusted 
to 1990 dollars using the consumer price index.  The information about these loans was 
provided by the Small Business Administration.   
DEPPOP is the average of the annual per capita bank deposits in the local market 
over the sample period.  It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita.  Before 
averaging, each of these annual per capita bank deposit amounts was inflation adjusted to 
1990 dollars using the consumer price index.  We use DEPPOP as a proxy for the total 
credit and liquidity available in the local market over our sample period.  King and 
Levine (1993a) suggest that the local market deposit base is a reasonable measure of 
market liquidity and financial development. This is also consistent with previous research 
such as Peterson and Rajan (1995). Our local market per capita bank deposits are 
calculated using FDIC Summary of Deposit data and the U.S. Census Bureau population 
data.  
The dummy variable HIGH is equal to one, zero otherwise, if the local market 
average annual per capita bank deposits over the sample period is greater than the 
seventy-fifth percentile (third quartile) average annual level for our sample.  SBAHIGH is   15 
an interaction variable equal to the dummy variable (HIGH) times local market average 
annual per capita SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP). 
SBAHIGH is our main variable of interest.  A negative and significant coefficient 
on SBAHIGH would imply that the impact of SBAPOP is smaller in areas with higher 
levels of average annual per capita bank deposits, or higher levels of financial market 
development.  Or, stated differently, SBA guaranteed lending has a relatively larger 
positive impact in those local markets that are less financially developed. 
   
Conditioning Set of Variables 
Following Levine (1997) and Shaffer (2006), we add a set of control, or conditioning, 
variables to Equation (1) that have been shown to be significant in previous economic 
growth or economic development studies.  These variables include PICAP, HERF, 
MSADUM, EDUCAT, GOVT, RETAIL, and OFFICE.  Definitions and data sources for 
these variables are as follows.    
PICAP is the average annual per capita income level in the local market over our 
sample period.  It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita.  Before averaging, each 
annual per capita income level was inflation adjusted to 1990 dollars using the consumer 
price index.  Local market per capita income data was collected from the website of the 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
HERF is the average sum of squares of the deposit shares of the commercial 
banks in the local market over our sample period.  HERF is intended to be a measure of 
the competitiveness of the local banking market.  However, it is often difficult to 
interpret.  We calculate HERF using the FDIC’s Summary of Deposit (SUMD) database.    16 
It is calculated on an annual basis using yearend data.  These annual calculations are then 
averaged over the 1991-2001 time period to get the local market HERF for our study. 
  MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if the local 
market is a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  If the local market is not an MSA, it is 
typically a non-MSA county.  We use this indicator variable to distinguish between urban 
and rural areas.  Dummy variables of this sort have been shown to be significant in 
previous studies (Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2007). Data for this variable was 
collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
EDUCAT is the percentage of local population over the age of 25 with at least 
four years of college as of yearend 1990.  It was collected from the website of the U.S. 
Census Bureau.  It is our measure of human capital differences across local markets. 
GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per 
capital (1991-1992).  This is similar to the measure used by Shaffer (2006).  It was 
collected from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to 
manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market.  This data was also 
collected from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau.   
Lastly, OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank offices in the local 
market over the sample period.  It is calculated from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposit 
database using yearend counts of the number of offices and averaging those counts over 
the 1991 to 2001 period. 
    17 
 
6. The Empirical Results 
Before discussing our results, we briefly summarize the conditions of the bank 
credit market for small firms over our sample period (1991-2001).  Data from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Surveys (Surveys) suggest three major trends over 
this period.  First, the demand for bank commercial and industrial (C&I) loans by small 
firms rose moderately during the first third of the period, remained strong and steady 
during the second third, and declined sharply during the last third.  Second, the Surveys 
report a steady easing of underwriting standards during the first two-thirds of the period 
and a reversal or tightening of standards during the final third of the period.  Lastly, the 
Surveys indicate that spreads on loans to small firms increased slightly during the first 
third, declined rapidly during the second third, and increased sharply during the final 
third of the period. Nonetheless, there are no indications from the Surveys that the C&I 
bank loan market caused a severe constraint on the credit available to small firms over 
our study period.  Indeed, the evidence supports the notion of a well functioning small 
firm credit market. 
Equation (1) is estimated using a GLS fixed-effects method.  Descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in the regression can be found in Table 1, and a correlation 
coefficients matrix for our main variables is presented in Table 2.  Our regression 
estimation results are presented in Table 3.  Notice from Table 1 that our primary 
variables of interest display large dispersions.  EMPR, our employment rate percentage, 
ranges from 98.67 percent to a low of 68.06 percent, with a mean of 93.67 percent.     18 
  Per capita SBA guaranteed lending (SBAPOP) ranges from a high of $416.39 per 
capita to a low of $0.00 per capita, with a mean of $28.33 per capita over our sample 
period.  Our measure of local market financial development---deposits per capita 
(DEPPOP), displays a wide range also.  The high for DEPPOP is over $10 million of 
deposits per capita, while the low is only $70 worth of deposits per capita, and the mean 
is $135, 200 per capita. A similar story can be told for our measure of per capita income.   
  In Table 2 we present a correlation matrix for our main variables.  There are 
several correlation coefficients in Table 2 worth mentioning.  For example, notice that the 
local market employment rate (EMPR) is significantly positively correlated with SBA 
guaranteed lending per capita (SBAPOP), per capita deposits (DEPPOP), local market 
per capital income (PICAP), the percentage of local population over the age of 25 with at 
least four years of college as of yearend 1990 (EDUCAT), local government expenditures 
per capital (GOVT), and the percentage share of employment in retail (RETAIL) in the 
local market.  And, several of these correlation coefficients are rather large. 
  These correlation coefficients for our independent and control variables suggest 
that multicollinearity may be a concern for the relationships between several of our 
variables.  These concerns about multicollinearity were evaluated using a variance-
inflation-factor (VIF) method.   
  In Table 3 we present the main results for our study.  These results are estimated 
using a GLS fixed-effects method.  The fixed-effects class variable is the state in which 
the local market is located.  Focusing on individual states as our fixed effect allows us to 
control for variations in state specific factors associated with systematic influences on 
employment levels within the same state.  Examples of these state specific factors are   19 
human capital endowments unrelated to measures of educational attainment, 
technological endowments and advancement, and state level public policies designed to 
influence employment rates.   
Notice from Table 3, model 1, that the coefficient (0.016) on SBAPOP is positive 
and significant at the one percent level.  However, in model 2 of Table 3, where our 
conditioning variables are added, the coefficient for SBAPOP is much smaller (0.008) but 
still statistically significant.  A similar story is observed for the independent variable 
DEPPOP. 
The coefficient on HIGH is positive, economically large, and significant at the 
one percent level in both model two (1.91) and three (1.94).  This strongly suggests that 
local markets at the high end of our financial developed scale tend to exhibit higher 
employment levels.  This is what was expected. 
Our main result for this study is associated with the coefficient on SBAHIGH.  
The coefficient on SBAHIGH is negative and statistically significant in both models.  It is 
a negative 0.015 in model two and 0.007 in model three.  The results for SBAPOP and 
SBAHIGH taken together strongly suggest that the impact of SBA guaranteed lending has 
a more positive and significant impact on employment in less financially developed 
markets.  The negative and statistically significant coefficient on SBAHIGH  implies that 
the positive and significant impact of SBA guaranteed lending per capita (SBAPOP) on 
local market employment is reduced from a coefficient of 0.008 to a coefficient of 0.001 
(0.008+(-0.007)). Or, stated differently, the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on local 
market employment in less financially developed markets is eight times its impact in   20 
highly financially developed markets.  These results have very significant public policy 
implications for how SBA guaranteed lending should be directed. 
Conditioning Variables 
The coefficients on most of our conditioning (or control) variables are consistent 
with our expectations and with previous literature such as Shafter (2006) and Levine 
(1997).  For example, P1CAP has a large, positive and significant coefficient (0.42) in 
Table 3, model 3.  This suggests that higher per capita incomes are associated with higher 
rates of employment. 
Our next conditioning variable, HERF, exhibits a large, positive, and statistically 
significant coefficient in Table 3, model 3.  Thus, the results from Table 3 suggest that 
local market deposit concentration (HERF) has a positive and significant impact on local 
market employment (EMPR). However, HERF may act as a proxy for low-density rural 
markets. So, we do not accredit any competitive interpretation to this coefficient.   
MSADUM is our next conditioning variable.  The insignificant coefficient on 
MSADUM  in Table 3 suggests that on average over our sample period employment rates 
tended to be similar in metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) as they were in non-MSA 
counties.  
Our next four conditioning variables were selected to link our analysis more 
closely to the economic development and economic growth literatures (Shaffer 2006).  
These variables include EDUCAT, GOVT, RETAIL, and OFFICE.  Recall that EDUCAT 
is the percentage of the population in the local market over the age of 25 who have 
completed at least four years of college. GOVT is a measure of local government 
expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per capital (1991-1992).  RETAIL is the percentage   21 
share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 
1990 in the local market.  And, OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank 
offices in the local market over the sample period. 
As might be expected, the coefficient (0.10) on EDUCAT is positive and 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  This also true for the variable GOVT and 
RETAIL.  Additionally, the coefficient on OFFICE is negative and significant, but 
economically small. 
Overall, these results lead to the rejection of our null hypothesis.  Recall that our 
null hypothesis is that the impact of SBA guaranteed lending on employment rates in 
lower financially developed markets is the same as it is in higher financially developed 
markets. 
  Our results imply that less financially developed local markets benefit relatively 
more from governmental interventions in the small firm credit market.  This relatively 
higher benefit is consistent with a credit rationing argument such as Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), where the intervention serves to ameliorate a market failure in the small firm 
credit market.  More specifically, the results also suggest that SBA guaranteed lending 
will have a much larger positive impact on social welfare if it is targeted to less 
financially developed local markets. 
 Robustness Checks 
  Several robustness checks were performed for Equation (1).  In particular, we 
estimated Equation (1) separately for MSAs and non-MSA counties and using 
disaggregated guaranteed lending variables for the 7(a) and 504 lending programs.    22 
Additionally, we estimated Equation (1) using a stacked regression (OLS) approach with 
our panel data. 
  All of these robustness checks yielded results qualitatively consistent with those 
reported in Table 3.  Additionally, because of the potential for multicollinearity in our 
regressors in Equation (1), we conducted a variance-inflation-factor (VIF) analysis.  Our 
VIF results suggest that multicollinearity was not a problem for the results reported in 
Table 3.  We also tested the standard errors in our regressions for possible 
heteroskedasticity and found that this was not a significant problem.  
  Additionally, we performed our analysis using different magnitudes for our 
measure of local market financial development.  For example, our results do not change 
qualitatively if we change the definition of the dummy variable HIGH by using the 
median instead of the third quartile.  That is, if we changed the definition of HIGH to 
equal one, zero otherwise, if the local market average annual per capita bank deposits 
over the sample period is greater than the median, rather than the third quartile, average 
annual level for our sample.  
7.  Conclusion and discussion 
SBA guaranteed lending programs are one of many government sponsored market 
interventions aimed at promoting small business.  The rationale for these guarantees is 
often based on the argument that credit market imperfections can result in small 
enterprises being credit rationed—particularly those in less financially developed 
markets.  If SBA loan guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing of small business loans, 
then there should be a relationship between measures of SBA guaranteed lending   23 
activities and economic performance, and this relationship should be more apparent in 
less financially developed markets.   
  We find evidence consistent with this proposition in this study.  In 
particular, we find a positive and significant correlation between the average annual level 
of employment in a local market and the level of SBA guaranteed lending in that local 
market.  And, the intensity of this correlation is relatively larger in less financially 
developed markets.  Indeed, one interpretation of our results is that this correlation is 
eight times larger in less financially developed markets.    
The public policy implications of our research are undeniable.  It strongly 
suggests that the SBA should directly consider the financial development of the local 
market when determining the optimal allocation procedures for the budgeted quantity of 
lending guarantees.  Local markets that are highly developed financially should receive a 
much lower priority in the overall guaranteed lending program.  However, before we 
advocate this particular public policy directive, we must mention some limiting factors 
associated with this current empirical research.   
  For example, our results should be interpreted with caution for at least two 
reasons.  First, we are unable to control for small business lending at the local market 
level and hence, we do not know whether SBA loan guarantees are contributing to 
economic performance by helping to complete the market or are simply serving as a 
proxy for small business lending in the market.  However, even if SBA guaranteed 
lending is indeed just an instrument (or proxy) for overall lending to the local market, we 
are still led to the strong possibility that at the margin, additional credit allocation to less 
financially developed areas has a relatively higher level of economic impact on   24 
employment.  Second, our study does not capture the effects of education or managerial 
experience on the access to SBA loan guarantees. Kim, Aldrich, and Keister (2006), for 
example, find that while neither financial nor cultural capital resources are necessary 
conditions for entrepreneurial entry, high levels of human capital can provide 
entrepreneurs with significant advantages for entrepreneurial entry.  The idea of certain 
unknown factors controlling access to SBA lending may influence our results.   
Both of these questions relate to a larger question.  That question is: What is the 
optimal level of SBA guaranteed lending in U.S. credit markets.  Future research should 
seek to shed light on this larger question.   25 
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1. These numbers do not include credit card balances outstanding at small firms. 
 
2. This is because each loan made would reflect a random draw from the pool of 
borrowers.  If the bank made a large number of small loans to borrowers in the pool then 
the bank’s loan portfolio would have the same risk and return characteristics of the pool 
of borrowers. 
 
3. Beginning in fiscal year 2005, the subsidy from the U.S. Government to help pay for 
the guaranty was eliminated.  The fees charged to 7(a) borrowers and lenders 
[supposedly] the entire costs of the guaranty.  The SBA estimates that that this new fee 
system will save U.S. Taxpayers over $100 million annually.   26 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (N=2358) 
 
Variable  Mean  Min  Max  Std Dev 
EMPR  93.67  68.06  98.67  3.00 
SBAPOP  28.33  0.00  416.39  29.48 
DEPPOP  135.20  0.07  10, 201.00  447.72 
HIGH  0.25  0.00  1.00  0.43 
SBAHIGH  8.28  0.00  416.39  23.64 
PICAP   15.562  6.637  36.772  3.080 
MSADUM  0.13  0.00  1.00  0.34 
HERF  0.32  0.06  1.00  0.06 
EDUCAT  18.05  9.80  30.51  2.14 
GOVT  3.65  0.26  7.67  0.49 
RETAIL  15.96  9.80  24.77  1.74 
OFFICE  32.68  1.00  426.50  35.42 
 
 
Notes: EMPR is the average annual employment percentage rate over our sample period 
[1991 to 2001] in the local market.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of SBA 
guaranteed loan originations per capita in market i over our sample period. DEPPOP is 
the average over the sample period of the annual per capita bank deposits in the local 
market.  It is calculated from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposit database.  It is measured in 
thousands of dollars per capita.  HIGH is an indicator variable equal to one, zero 
otherwise, if the local market average annual per capita bank deposits level is higher than 
the third quartile (or 75 percentile) of the average annual level for our sample.   
SBAHIGH is equal to SBAPOP times HIGH.  PICAP is the average annual per capita 
income level in the local market over our sample period.  It is measured in thousands of 
dollars per capita.  MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if 
market i is a MSA (metropolitan statistical area).  HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, 
calibrated to be between zero and one, in market i over the sample period.  EDUCAT is 
the percentage of local population over the age of 25 with at least four years of college as 
of yearend 1990.  GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of 
dollars) per capital (1991-1992).  RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail 
(as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market.  
OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank offices in the local market over the 
sample period.  It is calculated from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposit database using 
yearend counts of the number of offices and averaging those counts over the 1991 to 
2001 period. All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. 
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Table 2.  Correlation Matrix  for Main Variables (N=2358) 
 
 
  EMPR  SBAPOP  DEPPOP  HIGH  SBAHIGH  PICAP  EDUCAT  GOVT  RETAIL 
EMPR  1.00 
(0.00) 

















































































































Notes: EMPR is the average annual employment percentage rate over our sample period [1991 to 
2001] in the local market.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of SBA guaranteed loan 
originations per capita in market i over our sample period. DEPPOP is the average over the 
sample period of the annual per capita bank deposits in the local market.  It is calculated from the 
FDIC’s Summary of Deposit database.  It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita.  HIGH 
is an indicator variable equal to one, zero otherwise, if the local market average annual per capita 
bank deposits level is higher than the third quartile (or 75 percentile) of the average annual level 
for our sample.   PICAP is the average annual per capita income level in the local market over 
our sample period.  It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita.  EDUCAT is the percentage 
of local population over the age of 25 with at least four years of college as of yearend 1990.  
GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per capital (1991-
1992).  RETAIL is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or 
services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market.  All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. And, P-
values are in parentheses.   
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Table 3.  GLS Regression Estimation of Equation (1) 
 

































PICAP  --- 
  0.42 
(32.31)* 
 
MSADUM  --- 





  2.67 
(6.79)* 
 
EDUCAT  --- 
  0.10 
(8.48)* 
GOVT  --- 
  0.77 
(14.21)* 
RETAIL  --- 
  0.21 
(13.33)* 
OFFICE  --- 




2  0.051 
 
0.093  0.317 
F-statistic  189.33*  374.09*  274.10* 
 
This table provides parameter estimates for Equation (1): EMPR i = α 0 + α 1 SBAPOP i +  α 2 DEPPOP i + α 3 HIGH i + α 4 
SBAHIGH i  + β [Conditioning Set] i + ε i     EMPR is the average annual employment rate in percentage points over the sample 
period in local market i.  SBAPOP is the average annual amount of (new) SBA guaranteed lending in market i over our sample 
period. DEPPOP is the average over the sample period in the local market i of the annual per capita bank deposits.  It is 
measured in thousands of dollars per capita.  HIGH is an indicator variable equal to one, zero otherwise, if the local market 
average annual per capita bank deposits level is higher than the third quartile (or 75 percentile) of the average annual level for our 
sample.  SBAHIGH is equal to SBAPOP times HIGH.  The conditioning variables include PICAP, MSADUM, HERF, EDUCAT, 
GOVT, RETAIL, and OFFICE.  PICAP is the average annual per capita income level in the local market over our sample period.  
It is measured in thousands of dollars per capita.  MSADUM is an indicator variable equal to one [zero otherwise] if market i is a 
MSA (metropolitan statistical area).  HERF is the average Herfindahl ratio, calibrated to be between zero and one, in market i 
over the sample period.  EDUCAT is the percentage of local population over the age of 25 with at least four years of college as of 
yearend 1990.  GOVT is a measure of local government expenditures (in thousands of dollars) per capital (1991-1992).  RETAIL 
is the percentage share of employment in retail (as opposed to manufacturing, or services) as of yearend 1990 in the local market.  
OFFICE is the average number of commercial bank offices in the local market over the sample period.  It is calculated from the 
FDIC’s Summary of Deposit database using yearend counts of the number of offices and averaging those counts over the 1991 to 
2001 period. All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars.  T-statistics are in parentheses. “*” indicates significant at the 1% level.  
“**”indicates significant at the 5% level.  “***”indicates significant at the 10% level.  The model is estimated using generalized 
least squares (GLS) with fixed-effects conditioned on State of local market.     32 
  
Appendix A 
Characteristics of Loans Issued under the SBA 7(a)  




Average SBA Loan $ 
   Urban  Rural  Total 
Year  504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  262,159  207,984  213,260  300,958  205,233  213,592  213,345 
1992  302,788  244,221  249,582  316,912  232,181  238,305  246,923 
1993  325,592  250,624  258,006  346,530  244,144  252,845  256,859 
1994  341,261  205,738  218,756  334,919  184,367  195,604  213,855 
1995  350,786  150,363  169,179  364,684  125,882  145,227  164,796 
1996  376,730  190,938  213,915  341,966  145,963  168,762  206,933 
1997  369,753  224,912  238,320  310,629  174,399  188,908  231,171 
1998  385,883  236,159  253,764  308,272  199,479  212,395  247,994 
1999  412,650  253,674  270,483  335,416  195,475  211,379  263,591 
2000  427,095  260,575  277,788  343,140  197,743  213,899  269,633 
2001  440,611  241,833  264,551  361,987  195,511  216,531  257,741 
Sample  377,773  221,391  237,727  335,527  184,414  199,225  231,391 
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table IIA   
Total SBA Loans ($000) 
   Urban  Rural  Total 
Year  504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  168,044  1,235,636  1,403,680  58,687  418,265  476,952  1,880,632 
1992  380,301  3,043,969  3,424,270  96,975  912,007  1,008,982  4,433,252 
1993  564,577  3,978,656  4,543,233  148,315  1,125,014  1,273,329  5,816,562 
1994  1,015,593  5,761,698  6,777,291  207,985  1,419,439  1,627,423  8,404,715 
1995  1,165,310  4,821,247  5,986,557  234,127  916,799  1,150,926  7,137,483 
1996  1,727,682  6,204,515  7,932,197  269,811  874,902  1,144,713  9,076,910 
1997  1,219,816  7,273,196  8,493,012  199,424  939,313  1,138,736  9,631,748 
1998  1,464,425  6,725,796  8,190,221  191,437  919,600  1,111,037  9,301,258 
1999  1,521,028  7,908,288  9,429,316  175,423  797,344  972,767  10,402,083 
2000  1,319,722  6,984,461  8,304,183  166,766  768,827  935,593  9,239,776 
2001  1,238,118  5,266,396  6,504,514  185,699  694,065  879,765  7,384,279 
Sample  11,784,617  59,203,858  70,988,475  1,934,647  9,785,575  11,720,223  82,708,698 
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
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Table IIIA 
 Total Number of SBA Loans 
   Urban  Rural  Total 
Year  504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  641  5,941  6,582  195  2,038  2,233  8,815 
1992  1,256  12,464  13,720  306  3,928  4,234  17,954 
1993  1,734  15,875  17,609  428  4,608  5,036  22,645 
1994  2,976  28,005  30,981  621  7,699  8,320  39,301 
1995  3,322  32,064  35,386  642  7,283  7,925  43,311 
1996  4,586  32,495  37,081  789  5,994  6,783  43,864 
1997  3,299  32,338  35,637  642  5,386  6,028  41,665 
1998  3,795  28,480  32,275  621  4,610  5,231  37,506 
1999  3,686  31,175  34,861  523  4,079  4,602  39,463 
2000  3,090  26,804  29,894  486  3,888  4,374  34,268 
2001  2,810  21,777  24,587  513  3,550  4,063  28,650 
Sample  31,195  267,418  298,613  5,766  53,063  58,829  357,442 
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
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Appendix B 
More details on the Small Business Administration loan guarantee programs 
(from Craig, Jackson, and Thomson, 2008) 
It is interesting to note that the problem of long-term credit for small businesses was one 
of the primary reasons stated by Congress for establishing the SBA. 
The Small Business Administration was born on July 30, 1953.  The SBA received most 
of its powers from two agencies that were dissolved at its birth.  These agencies were the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) and the Small Defense Plants Agency (SDPA).
 3   
The SBA received the authority to make direct loans and guarantee bank loans to small 
businesses from the RFC.  It was also assigned the RFC’s role of making loans to victims of 
natural disasters.  As was the function of the SDPA, the SBA received the authority to help small 
businesses procure government contracts, and to help small business owners by providing 
managerial, technical, and businesses training assistance.   
Recognizing that private financial institutions are typically better than government 
agencies at deciding on which small business loans to underwrite, the SBA began moving away 
from making direct loans and toward guaranteeing private loans in the mid-1980s.  Currently, the 
SBA makes direct loans only under very special circumstances.  Guaranteed lending through the 
SBA’s 7(a) guaranteed loan program and the 504 loan program are the main form of SBA 
activity in lending markets. 
The more basic and more significant of these two programs is the 7(a) loan 
program.  The name of the program is in reference to Section 7(a) of the Small Business 
Act.  This is the section of the Act that authorizes the agency to provide business loans to small 
businesses.  All 7(a) loans are provided by commercial lenders.  A very large percentage of 
   35 
American commercial banks participate in the 7(a) program, as do a number of finance 
companies, credit card banks, and other nonbank lenders.   
It is important to note that 7(a) loans are made available only on a guaranty basis.  This 
means that they are provided by lenders who choose to structure their own loans in accordance 
with SBA's underwriting requirements and then apply for and receive a guaranty from the SBA 
on a portion of the loan.  The SBA does not fully guaranty 7(a) loans.  The SBA guaranty is 
usually in the range of 50 to 85 percent of the loan amount.  The maximum 7(a) loan is 
$2,000,000 and the maximum guaranty on that loan is $1,500,000 (SBA 2006).  For the 
maximum loan the SBA will guarantee no more than 75 percent of the loan amount.  Because of 
this, the lender and the SBA share the risk that a borrower will not repay the loan in full.
4  
The 504 loan program is a long-term financing tool for economic development within a 
community.  The 504 program provides growing businesses with long-term, fixed-rate financing 
for major fixed assets, such as land or buildings, through a certified development company 
(CDC).  A CDC is a nonprofit corporation set up to contribute to the economic development of 
its community.  CDCs work with the SBA and private-sector lenders to provide financing to 
small businesses.  There are about 270 CDCs nationwide.  Each CDC covers a specific 
geographic area (SBA 2006).  
Typically, a 504 project includes a loan from a private-sector lender covering up to 50 
percent of the project cost, a loan from the CDC (backed by a 100 percent SBA-guaranteed 
debenture) covering up to 40 percent of the cost, and a contribution of at least 10 percent equity 
from the small business being helped.  The SBA-backed loan from the CDC is usually 
subordinate to the private loan, which has the effect of insulating the private lender from loss in 
the event of default. (For more on the 504 or 7(a) programs see SBA, 2006).  